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Fuel Crisis Caused
by Government Interference
The main reason for the fuel crisis lies in the constant efforts of the authorities
to interfere in market mechanisms. This times interference has taken the form of
attempts to slow the objective increase of prices for petroleum products and the
participation of state organisations in fuel delivery, particularly to agricultural
enterprises. We shall not consider here other causes of the crisis, such as
instability of legislation and stamp duty rates; these factors have a short-term
effects and are present in any stable economy. Moreover, they testify to the
constant struggle between the government seeking as much tax revenue as
possible and private businesses aiming at profit maximisation. On the other
hand, state interference is a long-term factor which destabilises markets and
economic activities, creates conditions for monopolisation and corruption, and
leads to direct loss of budget revenues
Price restraints
Since the start of this year, world prices for
petroleum increased by 80 percent, but the
Russian and Ukrainian governments have
tried to restrain prices increases on
petroleum products. In both countries the
authorities consider these products to be
politically important, as their cost is an
element of practically all other prices.
Moreover, the petroleum price boom
coincided with the start of the grain harvest;
that is why the jump in petroleum product
cost could mean a considerable increase in
prices for bread from the new harvest, while
both governments consider this fact
unacceptable on the eve of elections.
Soviet practice dictates that officials must
adopt a simple decisionadministratively
limit price increasesbut the experience of
the past decade testifies that these steps do
not solve the problem, for they immediately
create a goods deficit. At best, the
authorities are forced to cancel their
decisions and demonstrate their incapacity
to foresee consequences. The latest example
is the attempt of the Kyiv City
Administration to control prices on sugar
and petroleum products. At worst, the
government does not acknowledge its
mistakes and endeavours to soften the
deficit problem by redistributing the limited
supply of goods; typical methods of
redistribution include imposition of export
restrictions, regional limitation of goods
flow, state interference in trade in scarce
goods, and direct confiscation of commodity
reserves from private businesses. Propensity
to this option was showed by the Verkhovna
Rada, which on July 20 adopted a resolution
obliging the Cabinet of Ministers "to restore
control over fuel shipments from oil
refineries" and "to examine the question of
wholesale supply of fuel and lubricants from
filling stations to agricultural producers".
In addition to short-term market instability,
a negative result of the "best" option
simple price restraintswill also be an
overall loss of confidence in the economic
policy of the government. The "worst"
optionredistributionis dangerous,
because it leads to decreased output as well
as export and import, increasing both the
deficit and prices, and also monopolises the
market, where under such conditions only
companies close to the government can
operate, thus favouring corruption.
A particular feature of the energy resources
market, inherited from the Soviet economy,
that exacerbates the mentioned tendencies
is the subsidisation of Russian oil and gas.
The Ukrainian government believes that
Russian enterprises should supply energy
resources at prices that are below world
(market) prices, and on credit.
The argumentation of this position is
incomprehensible. If the purchase and sale
operations are regarded as mutual benefits,
it will be possible only in two cases:
· someone compensates price differential to
Russian enterprises. The Russian
government can do this in exchange for
political concessions from the Ukrainian
government, i.e., partial loss of state
independence;
· the Ukrainian government also sells to
Russia (for example, grain or oil
transportation services) at below-market
prices. This option is less dangerous but
inevitably leads to negative consequences:
(i) only one supplierRussiacan provide
the conditionally cheap energy resources;
(ii) these special systems require the
participation of government or quasi-
government structures (so called
"intergovernmental agreements"),
promoting market monopolisation and
corruption; they are opaque and often turn
into latent budget subsidisation of certain
manufacturers. Such support at the cost of
state funds is provided only if the Ukrainian
enterprises selling at below-market prices
are state-owned (oil pipelines, in particular,
are such enterprises).
Both methods of fuel subsidisation have
weak spot: they work well under stable
external conditions. If the situation is
changed, howeverfor example, the world
price for petroleum risesboth methods
lose their advantage. Political concessions
are cheaper than real profit from the export
of petroleum, and intergovernmental
schemes need time to be designed and
coordinated with all participants. This is
what leads to fuel deficits.
Market monopolisation
The efforts of authorities to maintain low
prices (which often are unrealistic to begin
with) are a reason for the misbalance and
monopolisation of the fuel market. Another
cause is the direct participation of the state
and of its own hand-picked and authorised oil
suppliers in agriculturethe second-largest
sector of the Ukrainian economy.
Thus, according to a resolution of the
Cabinet of Ministers dated December 10,
1998, the Naftogas Ukrainy state joint-stock
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company and the Ukrnafta open joint-stock
company were charged with allocating
2 million tons of oil in 1999 to the State
Committee for Material Reserves for
processing, and delivery of petroleum
products to farms according to a list of the
Ministry of the Agroindustrial Complex. The
Ministry of Finance was obliged to allocate
450 million UAH, returnable, to the State
Committee for Material Reserves to purchase
another 1.5 million of oil. The government
planned that agricultural enterprises would
pay off the petroleum products with grain, in
an equivalent defined by the state, and
state enterprises were appointed to be the
operators. By July 15 the government
fulfilled 67 percent of the delivery schedule
for petroleum and 81 percent for diesel.
In this brief analysis we examine neither the
influence of these schemes on the viability
and financial state of agricultural
enterprises nor the most effective ways of
financing seasonal agricultural work. Our
aim is to show why the government scheme
led to a fuel deficit overall and, in particular,
to an even worse shortage of low-octane
petrol and diesel used by agricultural
producers. There are several causes:
1.  If state companies authorised by the
government take over large parts of the
market, the market becomes monopolised.
The government provides state and quasi-
state enterprises with tax privileges, low-
interest loans and better economic
conditions compared to private competitors.
Centralised delivery of fuel has led to lax
budget limitations for agricultural
enterprisesthey consider it acceptable not
to pay for fuel, and the state does not
penalise them. That is why the state applies
administrative and forceful mechanisms to
protect "its own" authorised suppliers.
Under such conditions, private enterprises
that are not involved in the government-
designed schemes sustain losses, become
noncompetitive, and leave the market. Here
we mean not only supplying the countryside
but the overall market of petroleum
products, as conditions for the development
of quasi-state enterprises are much better.
Monopolisation of the fuel market gives
opportunities to a limited number of
suppliers to increase their prices and abuse
their monopolistic situation to put political
pressure on the government.
2.  If government-designed schemes do
not work or work incompletely, deliveries
are stopped. Agricultural enterprises wait
for "free" fuel provided by the government
until the last minute, and private businesses
do not venture to enter the market
monopolised by the state. This will lead to
loss of the harvest and the further decline of
Ukrainian agriculture.
Thus, government efforts to provide
assistance to agricultural enterprises, as well
as attempts to help the poor through price
restraints, lead to much worse results than
the free action of market mechanisms would.
Meanwhile, systematic repetition of mistakes
for eight whole years testifies to the
existence of certain powers obviously
benefiting from maintaining this policy.
Hlib Vyshlinsky,
ICPS Publications Director
Educational Reform Begins
At the Local Level
The seminar worked on four guidelines:
· preparing and conducting research;
· developing a system for assessing schools
and programs;
· training staff for the educational sphere;
· institutional development of a system of
educational management at the municipal
level.
Separate tasks and methods to carry them
out were defined for of these themes, with
the following overall goals:
· to convince government of the necessity
to reform education;
· to ensure that changes are made in the
direction needed for society;
· to raise municipal education to a
qualitatively new level corresponding to
international standards.
The implementation of educational reform
at the local level is slowed by many factors,
among which participants of the seminar
noted the following:
· different approaches to understanding the
place and role of research in the process of
educational transformation;
· the current assessment system, which does
not perform the function of changing the
educational system in the proper direction
needed for society;
· inertness and conservatism of educational
structures;
· conflict between the current educational
system and the goal of reform.
A schedule for educational reform measures
was designed at the seminar.
In the short term (within 6 months)
the following was planned:
· to create an informational and analytical
group and a reform committee that will
study the progress of educational reform
and experience of other cities and
countries;
· to organise seminars and training sessions
to acquaint teachers interested in
educational reform with changes in the
assessment system; and to gradually prepare
schools to make these changes.
In the  medium term (within 3 years)
it is planned:
· to create an independent institute of
educational research;
· to prepare inaugural documents and
proposals for the creation of an institute
which will do assessment work (independent
inspection, independent center of testing
and certification);
· to formulate requirements for the new
assessment system and to test it;
· to develop drafts of changes in curricula
corresponding to changes in educational
content.
Plans for the long term (within 10 years)
included the following tasks:
· to build an infrastructure of independent
experts and researchers, analysts and
advisors for the educational sphere that will
facilitate social dialogue and societal
participation in decision making on the
development of education;
· to prepare programs, textbooks, and
manuals addressing changes in the
assessment system and in educational
content.
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